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Forty days after the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, the larger-than-life head of the
Revolución Bolivariana who dominated politics in the last 14 years of Venezuelan democracy,
voters in the Caribbean country had to return to the ballot boxes to elect a new president for the
2013-2019 term. Everything indicated that the governing party would repeat its success in the Oct. 7
election (NotiSur, Oct. 19, 2012), when, with more than 55% of the vote, Chávez buried the electoral
aspirations of Henrique Capriles, who received 44.3%. However, Nicolás Maduro, the Revolución
Bolivariana candidate hand-picked by Chávez when he was becoming aware that he would not
survive, defeated the opposition leader by only 1.83%.
What would be a sufficient advantage in countries like France, which in the last quarter of the 20th
century was essentially split in half politically, or the US, where in 1960 John F. Kennedy defeated
Richard Nixon by 0.1% (49.7% to 49.6%), does not seem sufficient in a country where Chávez had led
everyone to expect that he would always win handily.
The narrowness of Maduro's win will cause the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) to
undertake a process of self-criticism to find reasons to explain the scare it received. And it also
led Capriles to return to his violent past, such as when he encouraged the coup against Chávez in
2002. This time, he refused to accept the electoral results and called on supporters to "take to the
streets and vent their anger." Seven people died and several PSUV offices were burned when the
opposition "vented its anger" in Caracas and other cities.
At first glance, Chavismo knows that at the root of this vote loss are problems such as inflation
and insecurity—but not many more—as well as failings of the administration. In one of his last
appearances, Chávez warned, "We cannot continue inaugurating factories that are like an island
surrounded by a sea of capitalism because the sea will swallow them." He added, "We have to
change course."
In addition to those problems, other factors contributed to increasing social discontent. The
government alleges that the right worked actively to exacerbate society's negative mood through an
elaborate plan to create shortages of essential goods, cause power blackouts, and wage a relentless
campaign of unsubstantiated charges against Maduro that, nevertheless, were repeated and spread
by the media. That campaign, they say, caused some voters to desert Maduro and led to Capriles'
increased numbers.

Close vote a wake-up call for Chavistas
"This result compels us to do an in-depth self-criticism. That poor sectors of the population voted
for their historic exploiters is contradictory. While it's true that for months the country has endured
a destabilization campaign organized by the right, we are turning over every rock looking for our
own mistakes so as to not endanger this marvelous revolutionary process." That assessment comes
from not just any Venezuelan but from Diosdado Cabello, president of the Asamblea Nacional (AN)
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and PSUV vice president, a former soldier who stood shoulder to shoulder with Chávez in the 1992
failed coup attempt (NotiSur, March 11, 1992) against the neoliberal policies of President Carlos
Andrés Pérez (1974-1979) and the leader who, in the 2002 short-lived coup, was able to free Chávez
and return him to the presidency.
Cabello is not the only one within the PSUV who understands that Maduro's much-smaller-thanexpected victory is a strong wake-up call. Vice President Jorge Arreaza said, "It is up to us to review
and make the necessary corrections," and he called for "revolutionaries to reflect."
What needs to be looked at includes two pressing economic issues that could be very costly
politically for Maduro, as they would have been for Chávez or for Capriles if the outcome had been
different on April 14.
On Feb. 8, when Chávez was still alive, the government accepted reality and devalued the national
currency (NotiSur, April 5, 2013), the bolivar, by 31.7%. The opposition leader had a knee-jerk
reaction, calling the monetary correction a "red package" and saying that the action was the
beginning of "a succession of desperate measures that will be followed by an increase in the valueadded tax [impuesto al valor agregado, IVA] and the elimination of fuel subsidies."
The opposition and its allies created a Web site (lechugaverde.com), which has recently shut down,
on which they drove—up and down—the parallel exchange rate that, since the devaluation, has
fluctuated between three and four times the official rate, never less. The illegal market accounts
for barely 12% of currency activity, but it is a major headache for the government, which, since it
cannot control it, sees that it has become the principal price determinant and thus the major cause of
inflation.

Further economic changes inevitable
When Capriles spoke of a possible increase in fuel prices and the IVA—the easiest tax to collect,
since it is included in the consumer price of every product—he did so knowing, as did the governing
party and all political leaders, that such an increase was the next inevitable step, knowing that at
some time some president would have to take those measures simply because they are economically
inevitable. Venezuela has the lowest IVA in the region (12%) except for Paraguay (10%) and the
cheapest gasoline in the world (US$.02 per liter), which is unsustainable and for Chavismo also
contains an injustice that goes against the principles of the Revolución Bolivariana.
As early as December 2008, Humberto Márquez, a correspondent for Inter Press Service (IPS),
wrote, "The world's most inexpensive gasoline is sold in Venezuela, through a longstanding subsidy
program that benefits car owners while depriving the oil industry of a large source of funds for
reinvesting." Márquez also said the subsidies absorb resources that otherwise might go to programs
to combat poverty.
Four years later, in December 2012, an analyst with the Chinese news agency Xinhua quoted a
director of the Venezuelan state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) as saying, "Fuel is
being sold here at prices that cannot be sustained either economically or politically, because PDVSA
cannot produce at a loss when it works for the internal market and because poor Venezuelans have
no reason to continue subsidizing the luxury of rich Venezuelans."
Since the mid-1990s, the domestic price of fuel has not varied. At US$.02 per liter, to fill the tank
of a car costs, on average, about US$1, while in Mexico, for example, it costs about US$96. Some
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comparisons give an idea of this huge Venezuelan absurdity. The price of a Coca-Cola or a similar
soft drink in a café would pay for 75 liters of gasoline; the cost of a 1.5 liter bottle of water would
buy 100 liters of gasoline; and the cost of a cup of coffee at a coffee stand would buy 70 liters of
gasoline. To practically give away gasoline, the Venezuelan state and PDVSA maintain a subsidy
that, according to all estimates, is close to US$20 billion a year.
The beneficiaries, who consume about 790,000 barrels of oil (159 liters per barrel), are the owners of
some 4.5 million private vehicles that clog the streets and raise environmental pollution to humanly
unsustainable levels. Eighty percent of gasoline is used by private vehicles, which transport 20% of
the population, while the other 80% depend on public transport, which consumes only 20%.
Self-criticism, reflection, correcting errors, "turning over rocks" looking for failings. Such words
dominate the deliberations of this Chavismo without Chávez. In many, to the point of seeming to
have an air of defeat, although Chavismo won and will govern until 2019—and with a comfortable
95-70 majority in the AN and 20 of 23 state governors. But the election results show cracks within
the PSUV, with some 600,000 votes in October 2012 going to the opposition in April.
Chávez had said that it was impossible to move the revolutionary process forward if the community
councils were not strengthened and if the economy was not socialized to avoid "the sea [of
capitalism] swallowing it."
"Maduro will have to face the challenge of following the path marked by the overpowering
personality of Chávez, resolve the economic and security problems, rebuild a movement that shows
internal cracks, and discover how to govern a country divided in two equal parts," wrote Argentine
analyst Jorge Cicuttin in Revista XXIII.
The PSUV continues in power and will have to have an in-depth internal debate to determine why
the victory was so narrow but, above all, to build a new system of government, now without the
leader who made the most far-reaching decisions. The opposition will now have to decide how far
it will take its refusal to recognize the election results and its automatic rejection of anything that
the government proposes. Analysts estimate that it is about to cross a dangerous line but they think
there is still time to avoid this outcome.

-- End --
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